The Dormitory Student\u27s Fourth Amendment Right to Privacy: Fact or Fiction? by Morris, James M.
Santa Clara Law Review
Volume 9 | Number 1 Article 7
1-1-1969
The Dormitory Student's Fourth Amendment
Right to Privacy: Fact or Fiction?
James M. Morris
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Santa Clara Law Review by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.
Recommended Citation
James M. Morris, Comment, The Dormitory Student's Fourth Amendment Right to Privacy: Fact or Fiction?, 9 Santa Clara Lawyer
143 (1969).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview/vol9/iss1/7
THE DORMITORY STUDENT'S FOURTH
AMENDMENT RIGHT TO PRIVACY:
FACT OR FICTION?
Generally a warrantless search of private property is prima
facie unreasonable unless authorized by proper consent.' Exceptions
to this general rule arise "[I]n certain carefully defined classes of
cases." 2 Apparently the student dormitory room in a tax-supported
public university may be reasonably searched without a warrant
and without the student's consent provided a university official
authorizes the search.3 If evidence obtained as a result of a dormi-
tory search is admissible in a criminal proceeding, it is a fortiori
admissible in a university disciplinary proceeding against the stu-
dent.4 However, it does not necessarily follow that evidence inad-
missible in a criminal proceeding is inadmissible in a university dis-
ciplinary proceeding.5
Recent Supreme Court decisions indicate that the fourth amend-
ment's emphasis is directed towards protecting privacy rights rather
1 U.S. CONST. amend. IV: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized." See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) ; accord,
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S.
294 (1967); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). The right to be free
from unreasonable searches applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment,
and evidence seized as a result of such an unreasonable search is inadmissible in a
state criminal proceeding. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
2 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967). Upon balancing the
need for effective law enforcement with the right of privacy, "it may be contended
that a magistrate's warrant may be dispensed with." Johnson v. United States, 333
U.S. 10, 14-15 (1947). The term "effective law enforcement" connotes two situations,
first, where the safety of the police officer is or may be endangered, Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968), and second, where a delay by officers may increase the possiiblity
that evidence sought will be destroyed, Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 42 (1963).
- Moore v. Student Affairs Comm. of Troy State Univ., 284 F. Supp. 725 (M.D.
Ala. 1968); c. United States v. Grisby, 335 F.2d 652 (4th Cir. 1964) (Marine cor-
poral's living quarters searched on authorization of commanding officer); United
States v. Donato, 269 F. Supp. 921 (3d Cir. 1967), aff'd per curiam, 379 F.2d 288
(3d Cir. 1967) (U.S. Mint employee's locker searched pursuant to orders by the
security guard captain) ; People v. Overton, 20 N.Y.2d 360, 229 N.E.2d 596, 283
N.Y.S.2d 22 (1967), vacated per curiam, 89 S. Ct. 252 (1968) (high school student's
locker searched by permission of school vice-principal) ; People v. Kellyi 195 Cal. App.
2d 669, 16 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1961) (Master of college dormitory was deemed authorized
to consent to police search of defendant's room).
4 Moore v. Student Affairs Comm. of Troy State Univ., 284 F. Supp. 725 (M.D.
Ala. 1968). While Moore's holding involved the university proceeding, it apparently
implied that the same search would be upheld in a criminal proceeding.
5 Id. at 730.
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than property rights.6 Furthermore, the reasonableness standard
necessary to justify a search or seizure is now sometimes less
stringent than the traditional probable cause standard.7 In light of
these developments the threshold question in the case of a dormitory
search without a warrant becomes: Does the fourth amendment
guarantee privacy and security to the student in his dormitory room?
If so, then the reasonableness of a search of those premises may be
determined by striking a balance between the university's interest in
maintaining campus order and discipline, and the student's interest
in safeguarding his privacy.' This comment will examine the applica-
tion of the fourth amendment to the dormitory resident in a tax-
supported university in light of modern search and seizure decisions.'
The precise issue was recently examined in Moore v. Student Affairs
Committee of Troy State University,"° while an analogous issue was
decided in People v. Overton."
MOORE AND OVERTON
In Moore, two state narcotics agents, pursuant to "reliable
information" concerning the possible presence of marijuana on the
6 See Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968) (protection of union files located
in multi-desk office) ; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (protection of
individual's words utterred in public telephone booth). See also Black, The Supreme
Court 1966 Term, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 112-26 (1967).
7 Recent decisions emphasize the idea of "reasonableness" based on (1) the
exigencies of the particular situation and (2) a balancing of interests between the
public and private sectors. This has the effect of de-emphasizing the importance of
the traditional standard of probable cause. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)
("stop and frisk" held reasonable where police have reason to believe that suspect is
armed and dangerous regardless of presence of probable cause for arrest); Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (administrative search pursuant to warrant
held reasonable; "probable cause" for warrant exists if "reasonable" legislative or
administrative standards are satisfied with respect to a particular dwelling); Moore
v. Student Affairs Comm. of Troy State Univ., 284 F. Supp. 725 (M.D. Ala. 1968)
(dormitory search without warrant held reasonable if university official had reasonable
cause to believe unlawful act had been performed and acted pursuant to "reasonable"
inspection regulation).
8 Moore v. Student Affairs Comm. of Troy State Univ., 284 F. Supp. 725, 728-29
(M.D. Ala. 1968).
9 The law of search and seizure in general is undergoing change. The Supreme
Court, during the ten terms preceding the 1966 Term, handed down eleven opinions
concerning search and seizure. During the 1966 Term alone, it handed down nine,
plus two in the area of administrative searches. Three significant trends seem to be
emerging: First, the limits relating to what can be seized have been broadened, i.e.,
the Court has abolished the distinction between "mere evidence" and "fruits and
instrumentalities." Second, fewer types of cases are being exempted from the require-
ment that warrants be obtained. And third, the more functional approach of balancing
the public and private interests involved is taking emphasis away from the traditional
formulas for determining whether probable cause exists. Black, supra note 6 at 112.
10 284 F. Supp. 725 (M.D. Ala. 1968).
11 20 N.Y.2d 360, 229 N.E.2d 596, 283 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1967), vacated per curiam,
89 S. Ct. 252 (1968).
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university campus, made a warrantless search of six dormitory
rooms in two separate residence halls. The Dean of Men accom-
panied the agents, and a search was made of plaintiff's room, in his
presence, yet over his objections. The search was not incident to a
lawful arrest, 2 although there apparently was probable cause;"
nor was any other offense committed by the plaintiff in the presence
of the agents. 4 However, the search was conducted in accordance
with a university regulation granting university officials inspection
rights. 5
The district court held that the regulation was reasonably ap-
plied; the officials actedon a "reasonable belief" that the room was
being used for a purpose either illegal or likely to interfere seriously
with campus discipline.'" The standard of "reasonable cause to be-
lieve" which the court held to be lower than the constitutionally
protected criminal law standard of "probable cause," was applied
for two reasons: First, the necessity for maintaining order and
discipline requires a reasonable regulation allowing inspection; 17
second, college disciplinary proceedings are not criminal proceedings
in the constitutional sense and thus do not require an application of
the exclusionary rule. 8
But the court went on to state that even if the exclusionary rule
did apply, the search which took place in Moore would not be un-
12 Moore v. Student Affairs Comm. of Troy State Univ., 284 F. Supp. 725, 728
(M.D. Ala. 1968) (by stipulation).
13 "The school authorities in this case not only had information sufficient to
form 'reasonable cause to believe' plaintiff was using his room in a manner inconsistent
with appropriate school discipline, but they also had enough information to amount to
probable cause to believe the conduct was criminal." Id. at 730 n.11.
14 Id. at 728.
15 The Troy State University Bulletin 1967-1968 stated: "The college reserves
the right to enter rooms for inspection purposes. If the administration deems it neces-
sary the room may be searched and the occupant required to open his personal baggage
and any other personal material which is sealed." This same language appeared in the
"Oracle," a student handbook, and on the reverse side of a leaflet entitled "Residence
Hall Policies."
16 Moore v. Student Affairs Comm. of Troy State Univ., 284 F. Supp. 725, 730
(M.D. Ala. 1968).
17 Id. A reasonable right of inspection is necessary to insure that the university
will be able to perform its duty to maintain an educational atmosphere even though
it may infringe to some extent on the outer boundaries of the student's fourth amend-
ment rights. See also People v. Overton, 20 N.Y.2d 360, 229 N.E.2d 596, 283 N.Y.S.2d
22 (1967), vacated per curiam, 89 S. Ct. 252 (1968).
18 A proceeding held to preserve order on the campus by disciplining students
whose conduct interferes substantially with the educational function, does not require
adherance to strict constitutional standards, but instead requires only that "rudimentary
elements of fair play" be observed. Moore v. Student Affairs Comm. of Troy State
Univ., 284 F. Supp. 725, 731 (M.D. Ala. 1968); Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ.,
294 F.2d 150, 157 (5th Cir. 1961).
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reasonable. 9 The fourth amendment does not prohibit reasonable
searches when conducted by a superior charged with the respon-
sibility of maintaining discipline or security.2" And a student who
"rents" a dormitory room automatically waives objection to any
reasonable search conducted pursuant to reasonable and necessary
regulations.2'
Overton2" involved a search of a high school student's locker
by police detectives accompanied by the school's vice-principal. The
New York Court of Appeals held that the supervisory powers of
school officials, necessitated by the difficulty of order and discipline,
gave the vice-principal the authority to consent to the search.
23
It was his "affirmative obligation" rather than the invalid search
warrant which compelled him to inspect. 24 However, the United
States Supreme Court recently vacated, and remanded the decision
for reconsideration of the question whether the invalid search war-
rant negated the voluntariness of the consent,25 thus implying that
the vice-principal could otherwise authorize the search.
Notable in both Overton and Moore is the fact that in the
former the vice-principal retained the combinations to all school
lockers, while in the latter the university officials had a pass-key to
all rooms in the residence halls. Furthermore, in both cases school
publications reserved the right to regulate and inspect the premises.26
Though not directly in point, Overton is significant in that Moore
cited it for the rule that a reasonable right of inspection is necessary
to the performance of the institution's duty to maintain control and
discipline even though it may infringe on the outer boundaries of
the student's fourth amendment rights. 7
19 Moore v. Student Affairs Comm. of Troy State Univ., 284 F. Supp. 725, 730
(M.D. Ala. 1968). Whether this conclusion is dictum or alternative holding is not clear.
20 See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
21 Moore v. Student Affairs Comm. of Troy State Univ., 284 F. Supp. 725, 731
(M.D. Ala. 1968).
22 20 N.Y.2d 360, 229 N.E.2d 596, 283 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1967).
23 Id. at 363, 229 N.E.2d at 598, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 25.
24 The basis for the dissenting opinion was, in essence, that the vice-principal
was coerced by the invalid warrant. The majority opinion, on the other hand, said
that the vice-principal would have consented as he did regardless of the presence of
the invalid warrant. Id. at 362, 229 N.E.2d at 597, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 24.
25 Overton v. New York, 89 S. Ct. 252 (1968), per curiam. The Supreme Court
referred the lower court to Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968). In
Bumper, the Court held: "When a law enforcement officer claims authority to search
a home under a warrant which is actually invalid, he announces in effect that the
occupant has no right to resist the search. The situation is instinct with coercion-
albeit colorably lawful coercion." Id. at 550.
26 Moore v. Student Affairs Comm. of Troy State Univ., 284 F. Supp. 725, 728
(M.D. Ala. 1968); People v. Overton, 20 N.Y.2d 360, 363, 229 N.E.2d 596, 598, 283
N.Y.S.2d 22, 25 (1967), vacated per curiam, 89 S. Ct. 252 (1968).
27 Moore v. Student Affairs Comm. of Troy State Univ., 284 F. Supp. 725, 730
[Vol. 9
1968] COMMENTS
TIHE THRESHOLD QUESTION
When the issue of illegal search has been raised in the past,
courts have initially examined the nature and extent of the property
interest involved to determine if there was a constitutionally pro-
tected area.18 However, recent decisions indicate that the fourth
amendment protects a citizen's right to privacy even if he has no
property interests in his physical surroundings.- In Katz v. United
States,30 where a public telephone was wiretapped without a war-
rant, the fact that there was no physical intrusion or trespass was
not controlling. The Court held that the fourth amendment protects
people, not places.3 1 Hence the criterion becomes whether the in-
dividual seeks to preserve the particular activity as private, regard-
less of whether he is in an area accessible to the public. 2 Thus the
premise that property interests control the right of the government
to search and seize has been discredited. 3
This new emphasis on privacy prights was further clarified in
Mancusi v. DeForte.3 ' There, a defendant's standing to object to an
unconstitutional search was challenged. Defendant, a union official,
shared a large office with several co-workers, all of whom had com-
mon access to the union files. The Court held that his relationship
to the files was sufficient to allow him to challenge the method by
which the prosecution obtained the files: "[C]apacity to claim the
(M.D. Ala. 1968). The Moore court recognized the difference which exists between
the disciplinary requirements of high school and college students, but stated that,
"[N]o distinction can be drawn between the fundamental duties of educators at
both levels to maintain appropriate discipline. A reasonable right of inspection of
school property and premises-even though it may have been set aside for the exclusive
use of a particular student-is necessary to carry out that duty . I." ld. at 730 n.10
(emphasis added).
28 See United States v. Botsch, 364 F.2d 542 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386
U.S. 937 (1967), where the court found that since defendant's landlord possessed a
key to the premises he had leased to the defendant and had authority to receive
packages for him, he could authorize a search without violating defendant's right to
possession. In Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920), business
files were subject to defendant's possessory interests. In two eavesdropping cases, Silver-
man v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961) and Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427
(1963), the legality of recordings turned on whether or not there was a trespass or
physical intrusion. And Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960) held that in a
prosecution for possession of narcotics one who is present in an apartment with the
consent of the tenant at the time of search has a sufficient interest in the premises
to establish him as a "person aggrieved" by the search.
29 Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968) ; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347 (1967).
30 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
31 Id. at 351.
32 Id. at 351-52.
33 Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 306 (1967); Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
34 392 U.S. 364 (1968).
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protection of the [fourth] Amendment depends not upon a property
right in the invaded place but upon whether the area was one in
which there was a reasonable expectation of freedom from govern-
mental intrusion." 5
Moore recognized that fourth amendment rights do not depend
upon traditional property concepts.a By recognizing that a univer-
sity student has fourth amendment rights,37 Moore impliedly em-
braces the new concept of privacy. This implication is bolstered by
analogy; if a telephone booth and a large business office are con-
stitutionally protected areas of privacy, the dormitory room must
be attributed with the same security. 8
THE TEST: REASONABLENESS
While warrantless searches are prima facie unreasonable,a" a
traditional exception was made where the search was incident to a
lawful arrest under exigent circumstances, such as physical danger
to the police officer"0 or imminent destruction of the evidence
sought.41 However, the recent Supreme Court rulings seem to utilize
a new approach in determining reasonableness. "[T]he sounder
course is to make the scope of the particular intrusion, in light of
all the exigencies of the case, a central element in the analysis of
reasonableness."42 These exigencies should be tested by "balancing
35 Id. at 368. Note also Mr. Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Katz: "[Tihere
is a two fold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared
to recognize as 'reasonable.'" Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967). Thus,
both the belief of the individual and the circumstances confronting him determine
whether the right of privacy exists.
36 284 F. Supp. 725, 729 (M.D. Ala. 1968). Moore cites Katz for the principle
that fourth amendment rights do not depend on a "general theory of the right of
privacy." Id. But that "general theory" is the common law tort theory behind invasion
of privacy-the individual's "right to be left alone by other people." Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967). This general right of privacy must be distinguished
from the constitutional right to protection of private activities. "What . . . [an
individual] seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may
be constitutionally protected." Id. at 351-52.
37 Moore v. Student Affairs Comm. of Troy State Univ., 284 F. Supp. 725, 729
(M.D. Ala. 1968).
8 Obviously, the student residing in a dormitory room has a great expectation
of privacy. Under the old property rule, it was uncertain whether the student's room
was a protected area, as indicated in Moore. The rationale used to hold a search of
the room valid was one of consent. Moore v. Student Affairs Comm. of Troy State
Univ., 284 F. Supp. 725, 730-31 (M.D. Ala. 1968). But under the new emphasis on
privacy this rationale does not necessarily hold true; while a student may waive the
right of privacy, a third party should not be able to search without such waiver.
39 See cases cited note 1 supra.
40 State v. Chinn, 231 Or. 259, -, 373 P.2d 392, 398 (1962).
41 Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 40 (1963).
42 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 18 n.15 (1968). See Warden, Md. Penitentiary v.
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the need to search against the invasion which the search entails,"
although the notions underlying the warrant procedure and the
probable cause requirement remain relevant.43
In Terry v. Ohio,44 the crucial issue was not the propriety of
the officer's taking steps to investigate the petitioner's suspicious
behavior, but whether the invasion of petitioner's personal security
by being searched for weapons in the course of that investigation
was justified.45 The search initially involved a patting of petitioner's
clothing to determine whether he was carrying a concealed weapon.
Only after determining that Terry did in fact have a gun, did the
investigating officer require him to remove his coat. Balancing the
extent of the personal privacy invaded against the governmental
interest in preventing crime and the individual officer's more im-
mediate interest in self-preservation, the procedure taken by the
officer was deemed reasonable.46
Camara v. Municipal Court47 declared reasonableness to be
the ultimate standard in determining the validity of the search, add-
ing that "[I]f a valid public interest justifies the intrusion con-
templated, then there is probable cause to issue a suitably restricted
search warrant."48 Camara involved an attempted search of a dwell-
ing by local health officers. The court held that by applying a reason-
ableness standard and balancing the public and private interests
involved, a warrant could issue for "area" searches involving a
"relatively limited invasion of the urban citizen's privacy. '49 Thus,
while recognizing the warrant requirement for health department
inspections, the cause requirement for issuing such warrants was
reduced.50
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 299 (1967) where the court stated, "The permissible scope of
search must . . . at the least, be as broad as may be necessary to prevent the danger
that the suspect at large in the house may resist or escape." Warden, Md. Penitentiary
also broadened the scope of the search by holding a search is not limited to "fruits
and instrumentalities," but may include "mere evidence" of a crime. Id. at 306-07.
43 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1968).
44 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
45 Id. at 23.
46 Id. at 30-31.
47 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
48 Id. at 539.
49 Id. at 536-37. See See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545 (1967): "The [administra-
tive] agency's particular demand for access will of course be measured, in terms of
probable cause to issue a warrant, against a flexible standard of reasonableness that
takes into account the particular regulation involved. But the decision to enter and
inspect will not be the product of the unreviewed discretion of the enforcement officer
in the field."
50 The Camara Court disagreed with the holding in Frank v. Maryland, 359
U.S. 360 (1959), and quoted Justice Douglas' dissenting opinion with approval:
"Where considerations of health and safety are involved, the facts that would justify
an inference of 'probable cause' to make an inspection are clearly different from those
1968]
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Moore recognized the trend of modern search and seizure
cases, for it formulated a "reasonable cause to believe" standard
for university officials based upon the "special necessities" of the
student-university relationship." There the university's fundamental
duty to operate as an educational institution necessitated a reason-
able right of inspection, based on reasonable cause, even though it
might infringe peripherally on the student's fourth amendment
rights. 2 Moore's "special necessities" formula is tantamount to the
"exigencies" rationale employed in Camara and Terry. Also, the
court's standard of "reasonable cause to believe" seems to incor-
porate the "balancing" concept by which Terry and Camara con-
cluded that searches may sometimes-depending on the exigencies
or necessities-be conducted with less than the traditional probable
cause.
Moore followed the modern trend of search and seizure cases
by balancing interests and mouthing the standard of reasonableness,
yet failed to provide safeguards for infringements of student
rights. Although the subjects of the Camara search were selected
indiscriminately, a search warrant was nevertheless required. This
warrant, albeit issued on less than traditional probable cause, was
required to prohibit the "inspector in the field" from making the
decision to search the particular premises. 53 "[B]road statutory
safeguards54 are no substitute for individualized review, particularly
when those safeguards may only be invoked at the risk of a criminal
penalty."5 Yet, in Moore, where the rooms searched were singled
that would justify such an inference where a criminal investigation has been under-
taken. The passage of a certain period without inspection might of itself be sufficient
in a given situation to justify the issuance of a warrant. The test of 'probable cause'
required by the Fourth Amendment can take into account the nature of the search
that is being sought. This is not to sanction synthetic search warrants but to recognize
that the showing of probable cause in a health case may have quite different require-
ments than the one required in graver situations." Id. at 817.
51 284 F. Supp. 725, 730 (M.D. Ala. 1968).
52 Id., citing with approval, People v. Overton, 20 N.Y.2d 360, 229 N.E.2d 596,
283 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1967), vacated per curiam, 89 S. Ct. 252 (1968).
53 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532 (1967). In Moore, the Dean of
Men was summoned to the office of the Chief of Police on the morning of the search
and informed that the police had information concerning "the possibility of there
being marijuana on the campus." Later that morning a second meeting was held at
which a list of the names of students whose rooms the officers desired to search was
produced. At 1 p.m. the officers received additional information that some of the
students they were interested in were preparing to leave campus for a break following
the end of the examination period. Finally, at 2:45 p.m. the search of plaintiff's room
took place, and marijuana was found. From these facts it appears that the officers had
ample time to obtain a search warrant.
54 The inspector in the field had been required by local ordinance to display
proper credentials, inspect only at "reasonable times," and not obtain entry by force
where no emergency exists. Id. at 531-32.
55 Id. at 533.
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out beforehand, no warrant was required. By not requiring a search
warrant, but still following the "special necessities" doctrine to
justify the imposition of a standard less than "probable cause,"
Moore essentially leaves the student helpless to resist the invasion of
his privacy.
It might be argued that Camara can be distinguished from
Moore because Camara involved the threat of criminal prosecution
resulting either from the search itself or from refusal to consent to
such a search. However, Moore posed a similar threat. The express
purpose of the search was to uncover evidence of a crime, which
would, if successful, not only open the door to expulsion, but to
criminal prosecution as well.56
While the warrant procedure is the constitutionally prescribed
safeguard,57 recent Supreme Court history has shown that the fourth
amendment, standing alone, could not effectively protect citizens
from unreasonable searches.5" In order to sanction such searches the
Court has denied admitting into evidence the products of an unrea-
sonable search.59 But Moore saw no such need where the evidence
was presented in a unversity disciplinary proceeding."
TiE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
In 1961 the Supreme Court held that "[A]ll evidence obtained
by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that
same authority, inadmissible in a state court."'" Twelve years before,
the Court held in Wolf v. Colorado62 that the "security of one's
privacy against arbitrary intrusions by the police" was "implicit
in the 'concept of ordered liberty' and as such enforceable against the
states . ,,63 Nevertheless, Wolf failed to exclude from a state
prosecution evidence obtained from such searches. Mapp v. Ohio,
6 4
realizing that the right to privacy was basic to a free society, felt
56 Moore v. Student Affairs Comm. of Troy State Univ., 284 F. Supp. 725, 730
(M.D. Ala. 1968).
57 U.S. CONST. amend IV.
58 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Without the exclusionary "[Rlule the
freedom from State invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly
severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing
evidence as not to merit this court's high regard as a freedom 'implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty.'" Id. at 655.
59 Id.
60 Moore v. Student Affairs Comm. of Troy State Univ., 284 F. Supp. 725, 730
(M.D. Ala. 1968).
61 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
62 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
63 Id. at 27.
.64 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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that it could not justifiably grant that right yet fail to exclude the
products of its invasion. 5
Moore believed that the exclusionary rule should not apply to
a university disciplinary proceeding. The court followed the reason-
ing in Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education66 and intimated
that the rules of evidence, including the exclusionary rule, "[M]ight
be detrimental to the college's educational atmosphere and im-
practical to carry out."67 Moore implied that the application of the
rule was unncessary since a university proceeding does not involve
the detrimental consequences implicit in a criminal proceeding. 8
However, as previously discussed, the threat of criminal prose-
cution in Moore was very real. 9 Even if there is no criminal prosecu-
tion, the risk of irreparable harm brought about by suspension
or expulsion is always present in a university disciplinary proceed-
ing.
The courts have recognized the serious consequences attending
expulsion from a state university. "It is most unlikely that a public
college would accept a student expelled from another public college
of the same state. Indeed, expulsion may well prejudice the student
in completing his education at any other institution." 0 Since ex-
pulsion or suspension is universally recorded on the student's
transcript, he bears the stigma the rest of his life. With today's
emphasis on education the risk of losing "life, liberty and property"
is indeed tremendous.
Parrish v. Civil Service Commission7 realized that such a risk
65 Id. at 655.
66 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961).
67 Id. at 159.
68 284 F. Supp. 725, 730 (M.D. Ala. 1968).
69 See p. 151 supra. The threat of criminal prosecution was a deciding factor.
See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 527, 531 (1967). Camara overruled Frank
v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959). In Frank the Court upheld a conviction of one
who had refused to permit a warrantless search of private property for the purpose of
locating and abating a suspected nuisance. The Frank majority held that since the
inspector did not ask that the property owner open his doors to a search for evidence
of criminal action, which might have been used to secure a criminal action against
him, all that was involved was a less-intense "right to be secure from intrusion into
personal privacy." Id. at 365. Camara disagreed. While a "routine inspection of the
physical condition of private property is a less hostile intrusion than the typical police-
man's search for fruits and instrumentalities of crime," 387 U.S. 530, the rights in-
volved in an administrative search are certainly not "peripheral" as suggested in Frank.
It would be absurd to say that "[Tihe individual and his property are fully pro-
tected by the Fourth Amendment only when the individual is suspected of criminal
behavior." Id.
70 Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 157 (5th Cir. 1961).
71 66 Cal. 2d 260, 425 P.2d 223 (1967). Parrish can be distinguished from the
normal search and seizure case since it involved a mandamus brought by a social
[Vol. 9
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of loss can take many forms, only one of which is imprisonment.
There, the penalty threatened was a denial of a publicly conferred
benefit, that is, welfare payments. Although the searches involved
were designed to secure proof of welfare ineligibility rather than
to lay the basis for criminal prosecution,72 the California Supreme
Court nevertheless stated that the methods used were unconstitu-
tional. The court found that most of the homes to be searched were
selected at random without grounds to suspect violations of the
Welfare and Institutions Code.7 3 More importantly, the court rea-
soned that while a governmental body could decline to extend to
its citizens the enjoyment of a particular set of benefits, it could not
condition the receipt of those benefits on any and all terms it
pleased. 4
While there has been a great amount of controversy over the
question whether a university education constitutes a right or a
privilege, the fact remains that the interest involved is of tremen-
dous value. As the cases have indicated, education is "vital and,
indeed, basic to a civilized society. Without sufficient education
[one] would not be able to earn an adequate livelihood, to enjoy
life to the fullest, or to fulfill as completely as possible the duties
and responsibilities of good citizens."
7 5
The threat of forfeiting vital educational benefits in university
disciplinary proceedings is at least equivalent to the danger of losing
welfare benefits in administrative actions, and parallel to the threat
of criminal penalties imposed for refusing to submit to "area"
housing inspections. If the latter risk is a sufficient deprivation of
life, liberty and property to warrant application of the exclusionary
rule, then it seems that the danger of expulsion in the university
hearing justifies excluding evidence obtained through unreasonable
searches. However, if the university official can vicariously consent
to a dormitory search in the student's stead, then the opportunity
to exclude evidence would not even arise.
worker who was fired for insubordination for refusing to participate in mass morning
raids on the homes of welfare recipients. Petitioner asserted the unconstitutionality
of the search as a defense to the charge of insubordination for refusing to participate
in it. The court recognized petitioner's standing and thus reached the issue of
constitutionality.
72 While the court proceeded on the benefit theory, nevertheless it stated that the
county could not preclude the possibility of criminal prosecution. Id. at 265, 425 P.2d
at 226.
73 Id. at 267, 425 P.2d at 228.
74 Id. at 271, 425 P.2d at 230; accord, Bagley v. Washington Township Hosp.
Dist., 65 Cal. 2d 499, 421 P.2d 409 (1967); Rosenfield v. Malcolm, 65 Cal. 2d 559
421 P.2d 697 (1967).
75 Dixon v. Alabama State Ed. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 157 (5th Cir. 1961).
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SANTA CLARA LAWYER
CONSENT AND WAIVER
Traditionally, the issue of consent has been analyzed from the
property right approach to the fourth amendment. For example,
earlier cases invalidated searches made pursuant to a landlord's
consent.76 However, in some situations the court found that the one
consenting had a greater interest in the premises than a mere land-
lord.77 In People v. Overton, for example, the vice-principal was
deemed responsible for order, assignment and maintenance of the
physical facilities, including the lockers. Although the student was
entitled to exclusive possession of the locker, the court held that
this was vis-h-vis other students only; that is, the school maintained
a proprietary interest.
In light of the increasing emphasis on privacy rights rather
than property rights, the proprietorship rationale advanced in Over-
ton and accepted by Moore79 is untenable. The fourth amendment
protects people, not places,"0 and it is the individual's subjective
expectation of privacy that determines the protected area."' If the
privacy theory is extended to its logical conclusion, a co-tenant
should not be able to waive his roommate's subjective right to
privacy. By a parity of reasoning, the property oriented consent
rationale, which allows a co-tenant to consent to a search of the
premises, is of questionable validity. 2
Certainly the student residing in a dormitory has the right to
expect that other students will respect his right to privacy. He may
also expect the same from university officials. But Moore suggests
that in view of the inspection clause in the College Bulletin, the
76 Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961); People v. Roberts, 47 Cal.
2d 374, 303 P.2d 721 (1956).
77 See United States v. Botsch, 364 F.2d 542 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied 386
U.S. 937 (1967) (landlord retained possession of key to rented shed and received
authorization from defendant to accept packages for him) ; People v. Caritativo, 46
Cal. 2d 68, 292 P.2d 513 (1956) (caretaker of an estate believed he had a joint right
of control over premises occupied by defendant) ; People v. Gorg, 45 Cal. 2d 776, 291
P.2d 469 (1955) (student living in private home, no matter what his capacity in
reality, was looked upon by the homeowner as a co-tenant, giving the owner the
right to authorize a search of entire premises).
78 20 N.Y.2d at 363, 229 N.E.2d at 597-98, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 25 (1967). "Indeed,
it is doubtful if a school would be properly discharging its duty of supervision over
the students, if it failed to retain control over the lockers."
79 284 F. Supp. at 730 (M.D. Ala. 1968). Not only does Moore seem to accept
Overton's rationale of consent, but also intimates that the university retains the
proprietary interest and control over dormitory rooms. Id.
80 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
81 Id. at 351-52.
82 For example, People v. Gorg, 45 Cal. 2d 776, 783, 291 P.2d 469, 473 (1955),
held that "co-tenants" could consent. But under the privacy theory, it is implicit that
only the individual may waive his fourth amendment rights.
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student waives his right to be free from university inspections.
Moore thus intimates that mere knowledge of the specific regulation
constitutes a valid waiver. However, it seems reasonable to suggest
that by accepting residence in a college dormitory, the student
waives all rights of privacy. This seems diametrically opposed to
the fourth amendment right of privacy theory established by the
Supreme Court, since that right seems to be exclusive to the indi-
vidual. There must be a clear distinction between a student's intelli-
gent waiver of a constitutional right and his submission to authority
based on a fear of either disciplinary action or non-admittance to a
university.83 And if the privacy theory is to remain the law in mat-
ters of search and seizure, the consent rationale espoused by Overton
and embraced by Moore84 must either be altered or abandoned
completely.
CONCLUSION
It appears that the laws of search and seizure are undergoing
substantial change. The trend is toward protecting privacy rights,
not merely property rights. In essence, then, search and seizure
practices such as those in Moore and Overton are likely to be sub-
ject to close scrutiny by the courts.
Moore recognized that students have constitutional rights, in-
cluding the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
But no safeguards for the continued preservation of those rights
were enunciated.
While "reasonable cause to believe" may remain the standard,
a search warrant, such as in Camara, should be required for dormi-
tory searches. This would provide one safeguard. The exclusionary
rule would provide another. The consequences of arbitrary action
by university officials in light of the importance of education are
too great to be ignored by the courts. The dormitory student should
not be left helpless to pursue an education subject to the arbitrary
suspicions of university officials.
James M. Morris
83 Cf. Parrish v. Civil Service Comm., 66 Cal. 2d 260, 268, 425 P.2d 223, 229
(1967): "With increasing frequency the courts have denied the efficacy of any consent
to a search obtained by covert threats of official sanction or by implied assertions of
superior authority. The courts have been quick to note the disparity of position be-
tween a government agent and an ordinary citizen; they have taken cognizance of
the threat of unspecified reprisals which inheres in the official request for admission."
84 284 F. Supp. at 729 (M.D. Ala. 1968).
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